Smith v. Hooey: Underrated But Unfulfilled by Abramson, Leslie W.




Smith v. Hooey: Underrated But 
Unfulfilled 
LESLIE W. ABRAMSON*  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  THE POLICY FAVORING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CHARGES................................ 574 
II.  THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF DETAINERS......................................................... 575 
III.  THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF SMITH V. HOOEY............................................... 577 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN SMITH V. HOOEY........................................ 578 
V.  THE LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO SMITH V. HOOEY ............................................... 580 
VI.  THE JUDICIAL AFTERMATH ................................................................................ 580 
VII.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 582 
 
 
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to prosecutions in 
the federal courts and to state prosecutions through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.1  This constitutional right is probably 
the least favorite of the Bill of Rights, because it would satisfy most 
defendants if the government never—promptly or otherwise—disposed 
of their pending charges.  One group of persons, though, who may regard 
the right to a speedy trial as important are convicted defendants currently 
serving sentences, but who have pending charges brought against them 
by other states or the federal government.  For them, denying the right to 
speedy disposition of their pending charges can seriously interfere both 
with the nature and length of their incarceration. 
 * Frost Brown Todd Professor of Law, University of Louisville. 
 1. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967). 




While Smith v. Hooey received no attention from the general public, 
corrections officials and the American prison population at the time 
hoped that it symbolized more certainty in sentencing and correctional 
programs for men and women who return to society after prison life.2  
Although the decision has had a partial benefit for prisoners through the 
near-unanimous ratification of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
(IAD),3 the Supreme Court and lower courts have refused to extend the 
decision to include all prisoners who live with the uncertainty of pending 
charges.4
I.  THE POLICY FAVORING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CHARGES 
Undoubtedly, there is a public interest in protection from recidivist 
criminals who deserve imprisonment for a maximum period of time.  
There is also a public concern for effective correctional treatment of inmates 
not serving life sentences so that they can return to their communities as 
useful citizens.  When an inmate is serving a sentence in one jurisdiction 
and is charged in another (either with additional crimes or parole or 
probation violations), public protection and inmate rehabilitation can 
succeed by resolving the other charges quickly. 
The reality is otherwise.  The prosecuting authority in the other state is 
often satisfied to file a detainer against the inmate and wait until the end 
of the current sentence before pursuing the additional or revocation charge.  
The latter approach usually makes effective correctional treatment during 
the first sentence more difficult.  As the former Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons noted: 
    [I]t is in their effect upon the prisoner and our attempts to rehabilitate him 
that detainers are most corrosive.  The strain of having to serve a sentence with 
the uncertain prospect of being taken into the custody of another state at the 
conclusion interferes with the prisoner’s ability to take maximum advantage of 
his institutional opportunities.  His anxiety and depression may leave him with little 
inclination toward self-improvement.5
While the detainer is pending, the inmate may be ineligible for some 
correctional programs requiring a lower security classification.  Worse, 
sometimes prosecutors never pursue the new charge, producing neither 
effective treatment nor prolonged incarceration. 
 2. 393 U.S. 374 (1969). 
 3. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. at 1520 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 734 (1985) (holding the IAD 
inapplicable to revocation detainers); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976) (holding 
that defendant has no right to speedy parole revocation hearing for lodged but unserved 
detainer). 
 5. James V. Bennett, “The Last Full Ounce,” FED. PROBATION, June 1959, at 20–
22. 
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In addition to the harmful effect of detainers on security classification, 
multijurisdictional offenders are more likely to serve longer prison terms 
than if they had committed the same offenses in one jurisdiction.  The 
sentencing judge in the first state is “apt to view the violation of its laws 
in isolation and demand full satisfaction, while if all the offenses were 
tried together, the court, in fixing the sentence, could more easily consider 
the relation of the particular criminal to the entire series of offenses.”6  
Another harmful effect of detainers is that parole boards automatically 
deny parole to inmates with detainers or at least consider the detainer as 
a negative factor in the parole-granting process.7  Moreover, an inmate 
aware of an unfiled charge may decide not to prepare a parole plan 
because notice of the new charge will arrive at the prison eventually. 
II.  THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF DETAINERS 
More than a generation before Smith v. Hooey, lawmakers began to 
express concern about crime control in a mobile society.  In the Crime 
Control Consent Act of 1934, Congress endorsed state “agreements or 
compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention 
of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and 
policies . . . .”8  Congress recognized the need for effective crime control 
without jurisdictional impediments, as well as its authority to legislate in 
this area: 
    The rapidity with which persons may move from one State to another, those 
charged with crime and those who are necessary witnesses in criminal proceedings, 
and the fact that there are no barriers between the States obstructing this 
movement, makes it necessary that one of two things shall be done, either that 
the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government shall be greatly extended or 
that the States by mutual agreement shall aid each other in the detection and 
punishment of offenders against their respective criminal laws.9
A Joint Committee on Detainers met in 1948 to discuss the legislative 
need for standards to ensure the return of inmates wanted for trial or 
revocation proceedings elsewhere.  With the Council of State Governments 
serving as the secretariat for the Committee, it called for cooperation 
 6. Note, The Detainer: A Problem in Interstate Criminal Administration, 48 
COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1192 (1948). 
 7. See Note, Convicts—The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer 
Statutes, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 828, 835 (1964). 
 8. 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2000). 
 9. S. REP. NO. 1007 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 1137 (1934). 




among judges, the police, and prosecuting officials.10  Two years later, the 
Committee discussed a draft of an interstate additional charge detainer 
compact.11
The IAD is an interstate compact to facilitate the speedy disposition of 
new charges by one jurisdiction against a prisoner who is serving a sentence 
in another jurisdiction.  Prior to its enactment, there was no mechanism 
to obtain custody of a prisoner before her term of imprisonment ended in 
another state.  Under the IAD, when a charging jurisdiction files a 
detainer against a prisoner elsewhere, she must be promptly notified of 
the detainer and of her right to demand trial.12  There are two ways for 
the new charges to be resolved under the IAD.  First, the detainer 
process can be initiated upon demand of the prisoner, who must then be 
brought to trial within 180 days after she has demanded a trial.13  The 
IAD may also be instituted upon demand of the prosecutor, who must 
bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days after she is returned to the 
jurisdiction where the charges are pending.14  Failure to hold a trial within 
these periods will result in dismissal of the charge, unless an appropriate 
court has granted a continuance.15
Before Smith v. Hooey, the prejudicial effect of denying a speedy trial 
to a person imprisoned in another jurisdiction and the beneficial effects 
of the IAD were well understood among scholars and correctional 
officials. 
A convict is subject to the anxiety of a pending charge, and his defense is equally 
jeopardized by bringing him to trial after serving a long sentence when his 
witnesses may be unavailable.  In fact, prejudice to the convict’s defense may be 
increased because an imprisoned defendant “is less able on that account to keep 
posted as to the movements of his witnesses, and their testimony may be lost 
during his continual confinement.”  Moreover, to deny speedy trial to a defendant 
already serving a sentence inflicts upon him an additional punishment not levied 
by the formal judicial process.16
 10. LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, CRIMINAL DETAINERS 91–92 (1979). 
 11. One proposed section for the IAD, providing that all detainers must be filed 
before the sentence was imposed on the first charge (apparently to make it possible for 
the court to impose concurrent sentences), was ultimately rejected as too restrictive 
because of the difficulty in completing investigations in time to decide whether to charge 
before sentencing in the first case.  In addition, the proposal could result in detainers being 
filed even if the inmate received an adequate sentence in the first case.  ABRAMSON,  
supra note 10, at 92. 
 12. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III(c) (2000). 
 13. Id. art. III(a). 
 14. Id. art. IV(c). 
 15. Id. arts. IV(e), V(c). 
 16. Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1607 (1965) 
(quoting Arrowsmith v. State, 175 S.W. 545, 546 (Tenn. 1915)). 
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In addition, if a criminal charge remains pending until a sentence elsewhere 
is completed, the possibility of concurrent sentencing is lost.17  However, 
even with this ongoing dialogue among scholars and correctional officials, 
the lower courts were split on the speedy trial requirement.18
Despite the understanding about why a detainer mechanism was 
needed, by 1969 the IAD had been adopted by fewer than half the states.  
It took the Supreme Court’s call in Smith v. Hooey for good faith, diligent 
efforts to speedily prosecute inmates in other jurisdictions for state legislatures 
and Congress to act quickly to adopt the IAD as a means of implementing 
the Court’s mandate. 
III.  THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF SMITH V. HOOEY 
In March 1960, Richard M. Smith was serving a federal sentence in 
Leavenworth, Kansas when he and a codefendant were indicted by a 
Texas state grand jury for theft by false pretext.19  Six weeks later, 
Smith’s prison warden received notification from Texas that a state 
arrest warrant was pending.20  The notice also inquired about Smith’s 
minimum release date, which the warden determined to be January 
1970.21
As early as November 1960, Smith sent a pro se motion for a speedy 
trial to the Texas trial court.22  As the trial judge acknowledged, for the 
next six years Smith “by various letters, and more formal so called 
‘motions’, . . . asked either for a speedy trial or dismissal of the 
indictment.”23  The last of his motions to dismiss was apparently filed in 
 17. Bennett, supra note 5, at 20–22; Paul M. Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict 
and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 179, 182–83 (1966); Note, Effective 
Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767, 770 
(1968). 
 18. Compare State v. Heisler, 390 P.2d 846, 848 (Ariz. 1964) (endorsing a speedy 
trial right for the incarcerated inmate in another jurisdiction), and Barker v. Mun. Court, 
415 P.2d 809, 815 (Cal. 1966), and Richerson v. State, 428 P.2d 61, 66 (Idaho 1967), 
with Ford v. Presiding Judge, 167 So. 2d 166 (Ala. 1964) (no obligation to provide a 
speedy trial), and Ex parte Schechtel, 82 P.2d 762, 765 (Colo. 1938), overruled by 
Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 548 (Colo. 1985), and Petition of Norman, 184 A.2d 
601, 601–02 (Del. 1962), and Evans v. Mitchell, 436 P.2d 408, 412 (Kan. 1968). 
 19. Brief for the Petitioner at 4–5 n.1, Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (No. 
198). 
 20. Id. at 5 n.2. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 5 n.3. 
 23. Id. at 5 n.4. 




April 1967, but as usual the trial court failed to rule.  A year later, Smith 
sought a writ of mandamus from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
which lacked jurisdiction over such matters, but which forwarded the 
motion to the Texas Supreme Court.24  That court quickly denied his 
petition, relying on its own precedent that a state has no obligation to 
provide a speedy trial to a defendant who is in the custody of another 
sovereign.25  In August 1967, Smith filed a petition for certiorari, which 
was granted ten months later.26
Charles Alan Wright, a leading authority on the federal courts and a 
Professor of Law at the University of Texas Law School, represented 
Richard Smith in the United States Supreme Court.27  In his brief, 
Professor Wright powerfully noted that, under Texas law, Smith’s 
legal rights were a function of his location. 
 If petitioner [Smith] had been at large for the last eight-and-a-half years, 
and his requests for a trial had been refused, it could hardly be doubted that he 
would have been denied his constitutional right.  If he had been in custody in a 
Texas prison on some other state charge, the fact of that custody would not 
relieve the prosecuting authorities from their duty to give him a speedy trial.  
This is explicitly recognized in Texas . . . as it is by most jurisdictions.28
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN SMITH V. HOOEY 
Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court, 
first noting the traditional purposes of the constitutional speedy trial 
guarantee: “[1] to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to 
trial, [2] to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation 
and [3] to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of 
an accused to defend himself.”29  He then described the added burdens 
for a prisoner who has pending charges in another jurisdiction. 
    At first blush it might appear that a man already in prison under a lawful 
sentence is hardly in a position to suffer from “undue and oppressive 
incarceration prior to trial.”  But the fact is that delay in bringing such a person 
to trial on a pending charge may ultimately result in as much oppression as is 
suffered by one who is jailed without bail upon an untried charge.  First, the 
possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least 
 24. Id. at 5 n.5. 
 25. Id. at 5.  The Texas Supreme Court relied on Cooper v. State, 400 S.W.2d 890, 
892 (Tex. 1966), where the United States Bureau of Prisons’s willingness to make 
Cooper available for trial was of no significance to the Texas Supreme Court.  In 
Lawrence v. State, 412 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. 1967), the court reaffirmed Cooper. 
 26. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 5–6; Smith v. Hooey, 392 U.S. 925 
(1968). 
 27. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374 (1969). 
 28. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 8. 
 29. Smith, 393 U.S. at 378 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 
(1966)). 
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partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the 
pending charge is postponed.  Secondly, under procedures now widely practiced, the 
duration of his present imprisonment may be increased, and the conditions 
under which he must serve his sentence greatly worsened, by the pendency of 
another criminal charge outstanding against him. 
    And while it might be argued that a person already in prison would be less 
likely than others to be affected by “anxiety and concern accompanying public 
accusation,” there is reason to believe that an outstanding untried charge (of 
which even a convict may, of course, be innocent) can have fully as depressive 
an effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who is at large . . . . 
    . . . . 
    Finally, it is self-evident that “the possibilities that long delay will impair the 
ability of an accused to defend himself” are markedly increased when the 
accused is incarcerated in another jurisdiction.  Confined in a prison, perhaps far 
from the place where the offense covered by the outstanding charge allegedly 
took place, his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to keep 
track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired.  And, while “evidence and 
witnesses disappear, memories fade, and events lose their perspective,” a man 
isolated in prison is powerless to exert his own investigative efforts to mitigate 
these erosive effects of the passage of time.30
When a prisoner demands a speedy trial by the charging jurisdiction, 
that sovereign has “a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith 
effort to bring him before the . . . court for trial.”31  The charging 
jurisdiction’s lack of authority to compel the defendant’s return for trial 
does not excuse the obligation to grant her a speedy trial.  To achieve the 
letter of the holding, the Court also stressed increased cooperation 
between the states and between the states and the federal government.32  
While the Court emphasized the need for prosecutors to make a “diligent, 
good-faith effort” to bring defendants elsewhere to trial, it did not 
mandate prosecutors to file detainers as soon as they became aware of 
the defendant’s location.  The prosecutor could avoid the IAD’s intended 
effect by not filing a detainer until the defendant’s custodian was about 
to release her, because the IAD lacks a timely filing requirement. 
 30. Id. at 378–80 (quoting Bennett, supra note 5, at 21). 
 31. Id. at 378.  The holding means that the four-part balancing test of Barker v. 
Wingo applies to Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis for prisoners charged in another 
jurisdiction.  407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  The Barker factors are the length of the delay 
from the earlier of arrest or indictment until trial, the reason for the delay, whether the 
defendant demanded a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant as a result of the 
delay.  Id. 
 32. Smith, 393 U.S. at 381–82 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968)). 




V.  THE LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO SMITH V. HOOEY 
Smith v. Hooey is an example of an underrated Supreme Court 
decision because fewer than half of the states had ratified the IAD before 
1969.33  Seizing on the Court’s speedy trial mandate and the Court’s 
encouragement for interjurisdictional cooperation, within ten years every 
state but Louisiana and Mississippi had enacted the IAD.34  Increasingly, 
more prisoners could use the IAD to demand speedy resolution of 
additional charges in other jurisdictions because both the custodial state 
and the charging state were IAD signatories.35  Of comparable importance, 
when Congress considered and approved the IAD for federal and District 
of Columbia prosecutions in 1970,36 it clearly stated that the authority 
for the IAD originated in the 1934 Crime Control Consent Act.37  Eleven 
years after Smith, the Court clearly ruled that the “construction of an 
interstate agreement sanctioned by Congress under the Compact Clause 
presents a federal question.”38  The Court also appeared to say that even 
though a particular interstate agreement is not one that requires congressional 
consent under the Compact Clause, Congress “transforms the States’ 
agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause” if Congress has 
authorized the agreement and the subject of the agreement is an 
appropriate subject for congressional legislation.39
VI.  THE JUDICIAL AFTERMATH 
Having elevated the IAD to an available remedy for vindicating 
speedy trial rights as well as to a federal question, it was natural for later 
litigants to seek Supreme Court expansion of the IAD’s scope.40  However, 
 33. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1018, at 3 (1970); S. REP. NO. 91-1356, at 3 (1970). 
 34. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1389–1389.8 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN.     
§ 941.45 (West 2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20 (McKinney 1995). 
 35. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 226, 231 (Ct. App. 
1967). 
 36. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397 
(1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1520 (2000). 
 37. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1018, at 3 (1970); S. REP. NO. 91-1356, at 3 (1970), 
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4864, 4866. 
 38. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981). 
 39. Id. at 440. 
 40. Since Cuyler, the Supreme Court has decided other IAD-related cases.  See 
Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 151–52 (2001) (holding violation of the IAD’s 
prohibition on returning an individual transferred to another jurisdiction for trial to the 
sending State before trial is completed requires dismissal of charges); New York v. Hill, 
528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000) (holding right to trial within the 180-day period may be waived 
by counsel without the defendant’s express consent); Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52 
(1993) (holding 180-day period under the IAD does not begin until a prisoner’s request 
for final disposition is delivered to the court and prosecutor); Carchman v. Nash, 473 
U.S. 716, 734 (1985) (holding revocation detainers are outside the scope of the IAD). 
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the Court balked at opportunities to expand the rights of prisoners to 
dispose of other types of pending charges, disregarding the rationales for 
prompt disposition it found so compelling in Smith.  The litigants should 
have foreseen the Court’s reluctance to expand the IAD to revocation 
detainers. 
Just as Smith’s untried charges potentially thwarted his—and his 
warden’s—interests in his rehabilitation, revocation detainers equally 
harm prisoners, depriving them of possible concurrent sentences, 
complicating their treatment programs, and increasing the difficulties of 
defending the revocation allegations.  The Court had previously held that 
due process requires prompt hearings to revoke probation or parole, but 
the triggering mechanism for that right was taking the probationer or 
parolee into custody.41  Seven years after Smith, in an intrajurisdictional 
context, the Court held that a federal parolee, who was imprisoned for a 
federal crime committed while on parole, was not constitutionally entitled 
to a speedy parole revocation hearing when a parole violator warrant was 
issued and lodged as a detainer with the institution of his confinement but 
not served on him for ten years.42
If the Court was disinterested in giving speedy disposition status to a 
parole violation detainer within the same legal system, it was highly 
unlikely that it would be willing to extend the reach of the IAD to 
revocation detainers across state borders.43  Following Smith v. Hooey, 
only one legislature expressly amended the IAD to apply to revocation 
detainers,44 and lower court cases indicated that the IAD, without 
 41. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1972). 
 42. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 80–81, 86 (1976). 
 43. Courts have restricted the application of the IAD in four ways.  First, the IAD 
does not require that a detainer be filed within a certain time or at all.  See, e.g., State v. 
Ayers, 143 P.3d 251, 265 (Or. App. 2006).  Second, the IAD does not require dismissal 
of the untried charge when an inmate’s custodian fails to promptly notify the prosecuting 
officials of the charging state about the inmate’s request for final disposition of the 
charges.  See, e.g., Odhinn v. State, 82 P.3d 715, 722–23 (Wyo. 2003).  Third, the IAD 
does not apply to a person in pretrial confinement, awaiting a disposition of his charges, 
because he is not “serving a term of imprisonment.”  See, e.g., United States v. Paige, 
332 F. Supp. 2d 467, 472 (D.R.I. 2004) (collecting cases recognizing that the IAD is 
inapplicable to pretrial detainees); Painter v. State, 848 A.2d 692, 701 (Md. App. 2004).  
Finally, the IAD does not apply to inmates who have been convicted in another 
jurisdiction but not yet sentenced.  See, e.g., State v. Bates, 689 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 
App. 2004) (collecting cases). 
 44. In 1976, the Kentucky General Assembly amended the IAD, providing in 
section 440.455 of the Kentucky Code: “All provisions and procedures of KRS 440.450 
shall be construed to apply to any and all detainers based on unheard, undisposed of, or 




legislative amendment, was inapplicable to revocation detainers.  The 
broad view was that the IAD applied to any inmate “who is serving a 
term of imprisonment,” while the narrow interpretation confined the IAD 
to inmates with “any untried indictment, information, or complaint,” thereby 
excluding pending revocation charges from the IAD’s coverage.45
In Carchman v. Nash, the Supreme Court addressed whether the scope 
of the IAD included parole and probation violation detainers, as well as 
additional charges.46  The Court held that the IAD does not apply to 
revocation charges, even though the Court’s definition of a detainer covered 
the revocation context.47  Turning the Smith rationale on its head, the 
Court noted that delay before revocation would actually be advantageous 
to the prisoner and the court that hears the revocation charge.  First, 
delaying the revocation hearing provides more information about the 
prisoner’s progress toward rehabilitation.  Second, the uncertainties associated 
with an additional charge detainer are greatly reduced for revocation 
detainers, because the revoked prisoner is often sentenced to serve the 
full term of the suspended sentence.48  Because the Court did not view 
the effect of a revocation detainer as being as severe as an additional 
charge detainer, it was unnecessary for the Court to interpret the IAD 
language broadly to include revocation charges. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Smith v. Hooey recognized that an inmate in another jurisdiction needs to 
be protected by the right to a speedy trial even more than other 
defendants.  When the Court confirmed what both corrections professionals 
and inmates had known about the effects of pending charges, most states 
enacted the IAD.  As suddenly as the Court had appeared willing to 
consider speedy disposition rights for all inmates with pending charges, 
it soon restricted its concern about delay to untried charges under the IAD.  
unresolved affidavits and warrants charging violations of the terms of probation and 
parole.”  S.B. 356, 1976 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1976).  In 1990, five years after 
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985), the Kentucky legislature repealed KRS 
440.455.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 440.455 (repealed 1990). 
 45. See, e.g., Clipper v. State, 455 A.2d 973, 975 (Md. 1983), superseded by 
statute, MD. CODE ANN. § 645A(a)(2)(i), as recognized in Smith v. State, 694 A.2d 182 
(1997); Padilla v. State, 648 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Ark. 1983); State v. Knowles, 270 S.E.2d 
133, 134 (S.C. 1980); Suggs v. Hopper, 215 S.E.2d 246, 247 (Ga. 1975). 
 46. Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719. 
 47. A detainer is “a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in 
which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the 
agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.”  Id. (citing 
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 436 n.3 (1981)).  Article I of the IAD is clear that it 
applies to all situations in which an inmate faces pending charges in another jurisdiction. 
 48. Id. at 732–33. 
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More than three decades later, the only remedy for inmates and corrections 
professionals would be an unlikely, explicit extension of the IAD’s scope to 
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